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Autochthony, Citizenship, and Exclusion -
Paradoxes in the Politics of Belonging in
Africa and Europe
PETER GESCHIERE*
ABSTRACT
Our world seems to be globalizing, yet in practice, it is marked more
than ever by what Tania Murray Li calls "a conjuncture of belonging."
The notion of autochthony plays a special role in this obsession with
belonging as some sort of primordial claim: How can one belong more
than if one is born from the soil itself? Since the 1990s, the notion has
played a key role in politics in several parts of Africa. Yet, its spread has
now become truly global. Comparisons with other parts of the world
show that this notion retains its apparently "natural" self-evidence and,
hence, its mobilizing force, in very different contexts. This article focuses
on the notion of autochthony and its ambiguous implications for
citizenship and exclusion. The classical example of Athens from the fifth
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century BC is of particular interest since it was the very cradle of
autochthony thinking, yet it also highlights autochthony's inherent
ambiguities that haunt the world today.
One of the paradoxes of our time is the upsurge of strong
preoccupations with belonging in a world that pretends to be
globalizing. Notions of autochthony (literally meaning "born from the
soil") cropping up in highly different parts of the globe play a particular
role in this respect, as some sort of primordial form of belonging with
equally radical forms of exclusion as its reverse. The emotional charge
these notions recently acquired in different parts of the African
continent, including the Ivory Coast, Cameroon, and the Congo, to
mention the most obvious examples, will be well known. Yet, the impact
of autochthony and the concomitant obsession with belonging as some
sort of flipside of the processes of globalization reach much farther than
the African continent. My interest in this theme was triggered by the
surprising realization that during the 1990s, similar discourses on
belonging suddenly invaded everyday politics with highly charged
slogans in regions as different as West Africa and Europe.' The surprise
was all the greater because during this time, the core term
"autochthon," with which I had become familiar in Ivorian and
Cameroonian politics, had suddenly become a heavily emotional term in
Dutch and Flemish discussions on how to deal with immigrants. How
could the same language acquire such great mobilizing appeal in
completely different settings, and why did this happen at roughly the
same moment in time? For Southeast Asia, Tania Murray Li speaks of
"a deep conjuncture of belonging."2 It is quite clear that especially over
the last two decades this conjuncture is assuming proportions that are
truly global. People may think our world is globalizing, but an
increasing obsession with localist forms of belonging seems to be the
flipside of such globalization in many contexts, despite all their
differences. Li's term "conjuncture" is so well chosen since it brings out
that in various regions highly different trends, which seem to be
unrelated, converge into this global obsession with belonging. Therefore,
it is even more important to define the contexts in which autochthony,
as some sort of primordial form of belonging, emerges with such force.
In the context of this article, it is important to highlight the vastly
different implications of autochthony as a basic form of belonging for
1. This article is drawn from content in the Introduction and Chapters 4 and 5 of my
book, PETER GESCHIERE, THE PERILS OF BELONGING: AUTOCHTHONY, CITIZENSHIP, AND
ExcLUSION IN AFRICA AND EUROPE (2009).
2. Tania Murray Li, Ethnic Cleansing, Recursive Knowledge, and the Dilemmas of
Sedentarism, 173 INT'L Soc. Sci. J. 361 (2002).
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citizenship. Depending on the context, autochthony can become a
dangerous rival to national citizenship, drastically undermining earlier
ideals of national unity and the equality of all national citizens. On the
other hand, it can also be seen as coinciding with national citizenship.
In such cases, autochthony slogans demand a purification of citizenship
and an exclusion of "strangers." Indeed, whatever the exact pattern in
relation to nation and citizenship, autochthony always demands
exclusion. Yet, the exact definition of who belongs and who is excluded
can change dramatically and abruptly.
Related to this is the curious paradox that emerges in a number of
different settings and moments of the notion's long genealogy between
the basic security that autochthony discourse seems to promise (how
can one belong more than if one is "born from the soil?") and the
haunting uncertainties this discourse evokes in everyday practice. Its
apparent self-evidence, autochthony as an almost "natural" given, seems
to give autochthony discourse great emotional appeal and, therefore,
strong mobilizing impact in highly different circumstances. Yet, there is
a glaring contrast with its receding quality in practice. The "true"
autochthon tends to be constantly redefined at ever-closer range. The
search for an impossible purity in a world marked by migration and
mixing triggers both constant concerns about one's own autochthony
and an equally constant obsession to unmask the traitors residing in
one's native land. Recent history is full of lamentable examples of the
latter and the terrible violence cleansing these efforts unleash.
To understand why autochthony discourse has led to such tragic
events, it is helpful to follow this strange term and its basic paradoxes
through different times and places. Indeed, while researching
autochthony's history, the complex vicissitudes of the notion in time and
space became ever more intriguing to me. As previously stated, I began
to work on this notion because I was struck by the coincidence that the
same jargon abruptly became so politically charged in such different
contexts as Cameroon and the Netherlands; however, studying the
notion of autochthony in time and space turned out to be quite an
adventurous journey. I had not expected that it would take me to such
widely different places and moments.
Both past and present leading thinkers have used autochthony, but
they have done so in very different ways. Levi-Strauss gave it a central
place in his analysis of the Oedipus myth.3 Heidegger proposed the term
Bodenstandigkeit as a translation of autochthony and used it to promote
a more communitarian form of nationalism for Germany, as a contrast
3. CLAUDE LtvI-STRAuss, STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 213-18 (Claire Jacobson &
Brooke Grundfest Schoepf trans., 1963).
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to the very individualistic Anglo-Saxon and French versions of
nationalism.4 (Unfortunately, but probably not accidentally, Heidegger
developed these ideas in the days that he made overtures to the Nazis.5)
On the contrary, Derrida criticized autochthony as a mark of a too
limited (even "phallic") form of democracy, which countries urgently
need to surpass for a more universalistic version of democracy.6 All of
these important thinkers drew their inspiration from the same place:
classical Athens, the cradle of the very idea of autochthony.
I. CLASSICAL ATHENS: THE FIRST FORTRESS OF AUTOCHTHONY
The idea of autochthonia played a central role in classical Athens.
Apparently, the Athenian citizens of fifth century BC, the city's Golden
Age and the time of Pericles, Euripides, and Plato, were prone to boast
of their "autochthony" as proof that their city was exceptional among all
the Greek poleis. Since immigrants had founded all other cities, only the
Athenians were truly autochthonoi, that is, born from the land where
they lived.7 This was also the reason why Athenians would have a
special propensity for demokratia. The classical texts of Euripides,
Plato, and Demosthenes, some of which are discussed in this section, are
surprisingly vivid in this respect. To the present-day reader, it might
come as a shock to read in the text of these venerated classics the same
language of autochthony that is now so brutally propagated by Europe's
prophets of the New Right. Indeed, this similarity did not go unnoticed
by these prophets, as may be clear from an incident in France.
On May 2, 1990, a Member of Parliament in the French Assembl6e
Nationale, Marie-France Stirbois, also part of Le Pens Front National,
the most right wing party in France, surprised her colleagues by
delivering a passionate speech about classical Athens and the way in
which Euripides, Plato, and even Socrates defended the case of
4. See CHARLES BAMBACH, HEIDEGGER'S ROOTS: NIETZSCHE, NATIONAL SOCIALISM,
AND THE GREEKS 135-37 (2003); JOHANNES FRITSCHE, HISTORICAL DESTINY AND NATIONAL
SOCIALISM IN HEIDEGGER'S BEING AND TIME 286 n.62 (1999); Rob Garbutt, White
"Autochthony," 2 AUSTL. CRITICAL RACE & WHITENESS STUD. J., No. 1, 2006, at 5, 11,
http://www.acrawsa.org.au/ejournalFiles/Volume%202,%2Number%201,%202006/RobGar
butt.pdf.
5. See FRITSCHE, supra note 4, 138-42 & 286 n.62.
6. See JACQUES DERRIDA, POLITICS OF FRIENDSHIP 104-06 (George Collins trans.,
1997). See also MUSTAPHA CHkRIF, ISLAM AND THE WEST: A CONVERSATION WITH JACQUES
DERRIDA 43-45 (Teresa Lavender Fagan trans., 2008).
7. Indeed, the Athenians went even further by declaring their autochthony to be
absolutely unique among all the Greeks: their city was the only city where the citizens -
at least the "real" ones - were autochthonoi; therefore it could justly claim pre-eminence
over all the Greeks, and certainly over the Barbarians.
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autochthony. 8 Apparently, her colleague deputs were somewhat
surprised as, until then, Mme Stirbois' interventions had not portrayed
such an in-depth interest in the classics (or any academic subject for
that matter). Clearly, another sympathizer of Le Front National,
probably a professor at the Sorbonne, had written the speech for her.
The incident inspired two leading French classicists, Nicole Loraux (a
good friend of Derrida) and Marcel Detienne, to look into the issue of
Athenian autochthony. 9 Both authors show, with impressive eloquence,
that the Athenian authors should be taken seriously since these
classical voices sharply highlighted, maybe inadvertently, the tensions
inherent in the autochthony notion.
At first sight, the Athenian claim to autochthony seems to be as
natural and as unequivocal as, for instance, the claims of the new
President of the Ivory Coast, Laurent Gbagbo, that one needs to
distinguish Ivoiriens de souche (literally "from the trunk of the tree")
from later immigrants (Le Pen uses a similar jargon in France).
However, Loraux's and Detienne's visionary analyses show that it may
be worthwhile to take a closer look at Athenian language on
autochthony. A return to the classical locus of autochthony is rewarding
since the tensions and inconsistencies of this apparently unequivocal
notion come to the forefront in particularly striking ways. This may be
clearer from the following examples that testify to both the vigor and
the complexities of autochthony in Athenian thinking.
In Erechtheus, one of Euripides' most popular tragedies,' 0 the
playwright has Praxithea, King Erechteus' wife, offer her own daughter
for sacrifice, in order to save the city:
I, then, shall give my daughter to be killed. I take many
things into account, and first of all, that I could not find
any city better than this. To begin with, we are an
autochthonous people, not introduced from elsewhere;
other communities, founded as it were through board-
game moves, are imported, different ones from different
places. Now someone who settles in one city from
8. NICOLE LORAuX, NE DE LA TERRE: MYTHE ET POLITIQUE A ATHENES 204 (1996).
9. MARCEL DETIENNE, COMMENT ETRE AUTOCHTONE: Du PUR ATHENIEN AU FRANCAIS
RACINE (2003); see also LORAUX, supra note 8.
10. EURIPIDES, Erechtheus, in 1 THE PLAYS OF EURIPIDES: SELECTED FRAGMENTARY
PLAYS 148 (Christopher Collard et al. eds., trans., 1995). Unfortunately, only a few
fragments of the text have been conserved.
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another is like a peg ill-fitted in a piece of wood - a
citizen in name, but not in his actions."
This is heavy language under weighty circumstances. The play's
story is that Athens is threatened with destruction by Eumolpus and his
Thracians invading Attica. The Delphi oracle has prophesized that King
Erechtheus can only save the city by sacrificing one of his own
offspring. 12 The king seems to hesitate, but his wife shows him what
autochthony means in practice: "This girl, not mine in fact except
through birth, I shall give to be sacrificed in defence of our land. If the
city is captured, what share in my children have I then? Shall not the
whole then be saved, so far as is in my power?"13
Euripides' tragedy was based on a myth, placed in a mythical time,
but it was clearly topical to Athens' situation in 422 BC when the play
was first performed.14 At that time, the city was at the height of its
naval power, but it was already locked in mortal combat with its
archrival Sparta.15 Indeed, there was good reason for celebrating
Athenian uniqueness at the time. In other respects, Praxithea's words
must have seemed highly to the point for the audience. Her scorn of
people "who settle[] in one city from another" being like "a peg ill-fitted
in a piece of wood" no doubt had special meaning in fifth century
Athens, where the majority of the population were seen as foreign
immigrants (metoikoi).16 Adding to the scorn, quite a few immigrants
were wealthier than the true Athenian citizens.
With Plato, Athenian autochthonia seems equally self-evident. Plato
describes Socrates, who is instructing young Menexenes on delivering a
funeral oration for fallen soldiers (a big occasion in fifth century
Athens),' 7 as celebrating Athenian uniqueness in no uncertain terms:
"the forefathers of these men were not of immigrant stock, nor were
these their sons declared by their origin to be strangers in the land
sprung from immigrants, but natives sprung from the soil living and
11. Id. at 159.
12. Id. at 148-49.
13. Id. at 161.
14. Id. at 155.
15. See id.
16. Id. at 159.
17. PLATO, Menexenus, in TIMAEuS, CRITIAS, CLEITOPHON, MENEXENUS, EPISTLES 329
(R.G. Bury trans., reprtg. 1966). Socrates pretends in his dialogue that he has been
trained in how to deliver an epitaphios (funeral oration) by none other than Aspasia,
Pericles' famous spouse (or rather, "partner"?). Some emphasize the ironical elements in
the Menexenes dialogue. See DETIENNE, supra note 9, at 21. However, it seems clear that
once Socrates'/Plato's exemplary oration gets going, irony gives way to patriotism. See
PLATO, supra at 330.
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dwelling in their own true fatherland."18 As the next step in his didactic
model for a funeral speech, Plato, still speaking through Socrates'
mouth, makes his famous (or notorious) equation of autochthonia and
demokratia:
For whereas all other States are composed of a
heterogeneous collection of all sorts of people, so that
their polities also are heterogeneous, tyrannies as well
as oligarchies, some of them regarding one another as
slaves, others as masters; we and our people, on the
contrary, being all born of one mother, claim to be
neither the slaves of one another nor the masters; rather
does our natural birth-equality drive us to seek lawfully
legal equality.' 9
As in Africa (see below), funerals, and more notably funeral orations,
were a high point in the expression of Athenian autochthony, 20 and, as
will be explained later in this article, today's African funerals exhibit
many of the same expressions of autochthony. In general, autochthony
in Greece, as elsewhere, was linked to heavy ritual (like the above
funeral oration) and symbols that verge on the burlesque.
In another of Euripides' tragedies, Poseidon, furious that the
Athenians preferred the goddess Athena to him as the city's protector,
punishes Erechtheus for his dearly bought victory over the Thracians. 21
With his terrible trident, Poseidon cuts a deep cleft through the
Akropolis (Athens' main mountain) so that Erechtheus disappears in
the chasm. Erechtheus remains literally "locked in the earth," an
18. PLATO, supra note 17, at 343.
19. Id. at 347.
20. See, for example, LORAux, supra note 9, on Pericles' famous epitaphios for the
Athenians fallen in the first years of the long war against Sparta, and Demosthenes
funeral addresses from a later period (second half of the 4th century), when Athens was
threatened by the Macedonians (led by Philippos, father of Alexander). There are striking
parallels in very different times and situations. Compare id. with the famous dictum of
Maurice Barrs, a champion of French nationalism in the 1880's, that the main things
needed for creating a conscience nationale were "a graveyard and the teaching of history,"
DETIENNE, supra note 9, at 131 (quoting MAURICE BARRtS, 1 SctNES ET DOCTRINES DU
NATIONALISME 25 (1925)), and Peter Geschiere, Funerals and Belonging: Different Patterns
in South Cameroon , 48 AFR. STUD. REV., Sept. 2005, at 45, 47 ('The wild funeral rituals
among the Maka ... strongly emphasized the affinity between local groups and people's
place-their belonging-in the network of kinship. It was the negotiation of this kind of
belonging that seemed to be at the heart of the proliferation of death rituals and their
constant innovation."), and infra p. 334-35 (describing how certain funerals turn into
emotionally-charged festivals of belonging).
21. See EURIPIDES, supra note 10, at 149, 171, 173.
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appropriate position in view of his emphatic chthonic character, which
is invariably repeated whenever he is mentioned.22 Eventually, Athena,
the city's chosen goddess, saves the day. She ordains the consecration of
a small temple called the Erechteion, in honor of the "King-Locked-in-
the-Earth." The temple is situated on the Akropolis as the focal point for
celebrating Athenian autochthony.23
Indeed, burlesque as some of the founding myths of this Athenian
particularity may seem now, it is clear that, at the time, this heavy
symbolism had powerful appeal. In Athens, the reference to the soil in
autochthony discourse is affirmed by the rhetoric of funeral orations,
and the symbolism of the "King-Locked-in-the-Earth" in particularly
graphic ways. This confirms the idea that autochthony is a longstanding
trait of Athens. Indeed, this pride in Athens' autochthony as an old
tradition was so convincing that it was later accepted by many modern
classicists. 24
Yet, recently, several historians have raised doubts about this shiny
image of classical Athenian autochthony-doubts that must have
worried contemporaries as well. There is a clear tension with the study
of history as it was practiced already at the time. Striking is that two of
the most prominent historians of the Athenian era do not make special
mention of Athens with respect to autochthony. Herodotus mentioned a
wide array of autochthonous groupings, some more autochthonous than
others, but he did not mention this trait in relationship to Athens. 25
Thucydides seemed determined to avoid the very word "autochthon,"
probably because he distrusted its rhetorical use.26 Instead, he argued
that Athens' preeminence was due to its success in attracting
immigrants (the metoikoi) from all over Greece. 27 Indeed, the upsurge of
autochthony in Athens in the fifth century seems to be intrinsically
related to this influx of immigrants, who, especially in the Piraeus
harbor area, were rapidly becoming the majority of the population. In
sum, Athenian autochthony expressed a determined effort by the city's
citizens to exclude newcomers from citizenship.
22. See DETIENNE, supra note 9, at 42 (translating a variant of the king's name,
Erichthonios, as le Tris-Terrien).
23. EuRIPIDES, supra note 10, at 175 & 193 nn.90-91.
24. See Vincent J. Rosivach, Autochthony and the Athenians, 37 CLASSIcAL Q. 294, 294
(1987) ("Athenians of the fifth and fourth centuries claimed with pride that their ancestors
had always lived in Attica . . .. Related to this Athenian belief ... was a second, that, as a
people, they were literally 'sprung from the earth'. It is generally assumed that both
beliefs developed at a very early date, but this is merely an assumption, and ... we .. . see
evidence suggesting, to the contrary, that both ideas were relatively late developments.').
25. DETIENNE, supra note 9, at 49.
26. LORAUX, supra note 9, at 94.
27. Id. at 95.
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Vincent Rosivach, a historian of our times, even shows that the very
term "autochthon" must have been of a much later coinage, probably
circa the fifth century, when Athens was emerging as the major power
among the Greek cities.28 He proposes to distinguish between an
"indigenous" and a "chthonic" use of the term.29 It is certainly true that
Homer presents, for instance, Erechtheus from Attica as a chthonic
figure.30 But in Rosivach's view, this figure is expressed in a different
sense, as some sort of primal, serpent-like figure or monster closely tied
to the earth.3 1 It is only during Athens' upsurge that Erechtheus was
linked to the Athenians' search for proving their exceptional indigenity,
giving the chthonic component in autochthon a quite different
implication. 32 Rosivach's conclusions may be quite hypothetical,33 but
his insistence on the opposite understanding of chtonic origin-it can
also imply primitivizing a being or a group as some sort of primal
phenomenon-is very relevant in modern day situations. In Africa, as
elsewhere, autochthon's double meaning, as both prestigious first-comer
and as primitive or pre-human, comes up time and again.
In the same line as Rosivach, Marcel Detienne emphasizes that, in
general, Greek claims to autochthony must be somewhat ahistorical
since those claims denied per definition the great era of Greek
colonization of the seventh and sixth century BC, when new poleis were
founded all over the Eastern Mediterranean in an adventurous
expansion process. 34 Even Athens was largely a city in formation up to
the fifth century.35 It is indeed striking that the laws on citizenship
28. See Rosivach, supra note 24, at 297 ("[S]ince autochthony is not simply a matter of
difference but one of superiority, the concept may well have become prominent as late as
the 470s and beyond when the Athenians became rivals with the Dorian Spartans.")
29. See id. at 294-301.
30. See id. at 294-95.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 294 ("[I]n the course of time ... the Athenians did come to associate
Erechtheus' chthonic origins with their own indigenous origins .... ").
33. It is indeed clear that the veneration of Erechtheus, the arch-father of Athenian
autochthony-the king, mentioned before, who was so graphically locked inside the earth
itself by Poseidon's revenge-cannot be that old. Archaeologists maintain now that the
Erectheum, his temple where Athenian autochthony was sanctified, was built between
430 and 422 B.C. DETIENNE, supra note 9, at 44. That is at the very same time that
Euripides wrote his Erechtheus play in which Athena ordered the Athenians to build this
temple. EURIPIDES, supra note 10, at 193. A similar tension between founding and
belonging also haunts Plato's Republic. The founder of his model city-who necessarily
must have come from elsewhere to found his "new" city-has to acquire a certain aura of
autochthony in order to create a myth of belonging. Plato describes this as "a beautiful
lie," that will serve as a basis for the civic instruction of its newly settled citizens. See
Rosivach, supra note 24, at 303. Cf. LORAUX, supra note 9, at 176.
34. DETIENNE, supra note 9, at.52 -53.
35. Id.
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promulgated in 509 BC by Cleisthenes, Athens' great legislator during
the city's ascension, were much more inclusive than Pericles' citizenship
law from 451 BC, during the city's heyday. 36 Although Pericles' law
came only a little over fifty years later, it brought incisive changes,
reserving Athenian citizenship only for those who could claim that both
parents were Athenian.3 7
Nicole Loraux problematizes Athenian autochthony-and hence
autochthony in general-at an even deeper level. For her, the insistence
on having remained on the same spot is a basic denial of history, which
always implies movement.38 Athenian autochthony is a kind of negative
history, which always needs an "Other"-movement in whatever form-
in order to define itself.39 On a practical level, this implied for Athenians
a guilty denial of memories of earlier migrations, especially for the city's
aristocratic families who were once proud of their founding histories,
often referring to their proclaimed provenance as some sort of mythical
charter. 40 Loraux signals that in other classical texts on autochthony,
history and movement are a hidden subtext undermining autochthony's
rigid memory.4 1
A blatant expression of this can be found in one of Euripides' most
famous tragedies, lon, which is probably his most outspoken celebration
of autochthony. 42 For modern readers (and viewers), the force of the play
mostly lies in Euripides' beautiful verses, in which he allows the actors
to express their rage against the gods and the careless way the gods
handle mortals. But another possible reading of the text, one that takes
into account Athenians' preoccupation with autochthony, suggests that
this latter theme must have been at least as important. Consider Ion's
statement when his new "father" (who later turns out not to be his real
father) tries to take him to Athens while Ion still believes he himself is a
stranger to the city:
36. Id. at 53.
37. Id. Again the parallels with present-day struggles are striking. For example, Le
Pen's half-hearted attempts to fix the notion of Frangais de souche as reserved to those
who have four grand-parents born in France-a proposition he rapidly had to give up since
many of his followers would not meet this criterion, or the fierce debates in Ivory Coast,
directly related to the contested position of Alassane Ouattara (the leading politician from
the North), over "and" versus "or"-that is, whether father and mother had to be Ivorian
in order to grant Ivorian citizenship to their off-spring; or would father or mother suffice
for this?
38. See LORAUX, supra note 9, at 99.
39. See id. at 82 ("[The discussion of being a native is fragile because by definition [the
native] needs others, even if it means being rejected in one's non-belonging.")
40. Id. at 84.
41. Id.
42. EURIPIDES, Ion, in EURIPIDES, TROJAN WOMEN; IPHIGENIA AMONG THE TAURIANS;
ION 313 (David Kovacs ed., trans.1999).
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They say that the famous Athenians, born from the soil,
are no immigrant race. I would be suffering from two
disabilities if I were cast there, both the foreignness of
my father and my own bastardy. . . . For if a foreigner,
even though nominally a citizen, comes into that pure-
bred city, his tongue is enslaved and he has no freedom
of speech.43
This is vintage autochthony thinking. However, as the tragedy unfolds,
this theme leads to so many complications that the story can also be
read as some sort of carnival of autochthony. Ion must be crowned in the
end as Athens' truly autochthonous king, even though he is Apollon's
son and adopted by a father who is in fact a stranger (the latter is even
led to believe that he is Ion's "real" father).44 As Detienne puts it so
graphically, "nothing is impossible in autochthony."45
There is a clear reflection here of the deep unrest in autochthony
thinking, which Loraux brings out so well by insisting on the sheer
impossibility of excluding history.46 People are not what they seem to be.
If a foreigner, like Ion, can turn out to be an autochthon, the reverse can
also be true. Indeed, the obsession with having traitors on the "inside"
and the urgent need to unmask them, which is evident from the recent
developments in the Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Rwanda, and many other
hotspots of autochthony, was very present in classical Athens as well. If
someone put an Athenian's citizenship into doubt, the Athenian could
summon the slanderer before a city tribunal.47 However, this implied a
huge risk. If the slanderer's accusations were indeed correct, his target
would not only lose his citizenship, but also his liberty, as he could be
sold as a slave.48
The above may indicate why the present-day New Right in Europe
is tempted to quote the celebration of autochthony in classical Athens as
a precedent to be respected. However, both Loraux and Detienne
convincingly show that upon closer reading, these texts highlight the
basic impossibilities of autochthony. In ancient Athens, autochthony
struggled to come to terms with a history that constantly undermined
the apparent self-evidence of chthonic belonging. Even more
43. Id. at 397, 403. Later, this same Ion is to learn that his "real" mother is the sole
inheritor of the city's autochthonous royal line-Greek stories seem to love playing havoc
with lines of descent!
44. Id. at 317-18, 505-15.
45. DETIENNE, supra note 9, at 59.
46. LORAUX, supra note 9, at 195.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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importantly, the texts create great uncertainty about "authentic" and
"fake" autochthony, hence the obsession with purification and the
unmasking of traitors-in-our-midst.49 Such uncertainties make the
notion, despite its apparent self-evidence, a fickle basis for the definition
of citizenship, and unfortunately this problem is all too relevant for
autochthony's present-day trajectories.
II. AUTOCHTHONY Now: GLOBALIZATION AND THE NEO-LIBERAL TURN
Clearly then, autochthony has had a long history. The discourse of
its present-day protagonists is certainly not new; rather, it brings a
reshuffling of elements from former days. Beginning in the late 1980s
and continuing to the present day, autochthony has experienced a
powerful renaissance. Yet, the question remains: Why has autochthony
become such a tempting form of discourse in many parts of the globe?
Tania Murray Li's notion of a "conjuncture of belonging" points to
various aspects of what has come to be called "globalization" as
important factors.50 One important aspect of globalization is the rapidly
increasing mobility of people, on both a national and transnational
scale, which produces a wider context for people's preoccupation with
belonging.51 But Li's approach also allows one to outline more specific
49. Marcel Detienne focuses in his last chapter also on present-day historians and
their ongoing contribution to the reproduction of autochthony thinking. DETIENNE, supra
note 9, at 139. His main example-and indeed a quite shocking one-is Fernand Braudel
and one his more recent books. FERNAND BRAUDEL, L'IDENTITE DE FRANCE: ESPACE ET
HISTOIRE (1986) [hereinafter BRAUDEL, L'IDENTITEJ. Braudel had first made his name
with La Mediterrande, which showed in a challenging way how to write a history that
surpassed the limits of the nation-state and nationalist thinking. FERNAND BRAUDEL, LA
MEDITERRANEE ET LE MONDE MEDITERRANEEN A L'EPOQUE DE PHILIPPE II (1949). So it is,
indeed, a bit disconcerting that the same Braudel starts this later book by emphasizing
that, after all, a historian is really at home with the history of his own country-a
familiarity that brings Braudel to project notre hexagone (the favourite national metaphor
to indicate France and its territory) back into pre-historical times, and to link the
paleolithic drawings of Lascaux to French identity. BRAUDEL, L'IDENTITt, supra, at 10.
Detienne cites all this as an illustration of the "extra-ordinary weight of nationalist
thinking" that in the end could even constrain the view of an historian with such a broad
vision as Braudel. DETIENNE, supra note 9, at 142.
50. See Li, supra note 2.
51. Historians, see, for example, Jan Lucassen & Leo Lucassen, Migration, Migration
History, History: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives, in MIGRATION, MIGRATION
HISTORY, HISTORY: OLD PARADIGMS AND NEW PERSPECTIVES 9, 28-31 (Jan Lucassen & Leo
Lucassen eds., 1997), may emphasize that, demographically, migration in many parts of
the world was more important in earlier centuries. Yet it is clear that the facilitation of
mobility by new technology conjures up a vision of a rapid increase of migration, and it is
precisely this vision that plays such a central role in much autochthony discourse. See also
ARIUN APPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE: CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION 37
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factors that vary from region to region. Li emphasizes global concerns
over the loss of biodiversity, "indigenous people," and "disappearing
cultures," as crucial factors in this upsurge of concerns over belonging. 52
For Africa, the predominant globalizing factors might be the twin
processes of democratization and decentralization, both closely related
to the recent emphasis on the need to "bypass" the state in the policies
of the global development establishment.
Throughout the continent in the early 1990s, a new wave of
democratization seemed initially to signal a promising turn towards
political liberalization. Yet, in many countries, it inspired attempts
toward closure in order to exclude fellow countrymen from their full
rights as national citizens or, at least, to differentiate between citizens
who "belong" and others who do not. The Ivory Coast offers particularly
tragic examples, as evidenced by the Opbration nationale
d'identification, which was announced in 2002 with some fanfare by the
country's new President Laurent Gbagbo,5 3 confirmed champion of
autochthony. The idea was that each person had to return to his or her
village of origin in order to claim national citizenship. 54 All persons who
could not identify a specific village within the country as their place of
origin would automatically lose their citizenship.55
In eastern Congo, the enigmatic Banyamulenge (opponents call
them Banyarwanda, meaning "Rwanda people"), similarly became the
object of fierce struggles over belonging and autochthony, fanned by
former President Mobutu's machiavellistic manipulations in offering
them full citizenship and withdrawing it at will.5 6 In Anglophone Africa,
belonging also became a crucial issue in the new style of politics. In
Zambia, former President Kenneth Kaunda was excluded from the
political competition with the simple claim that he "really" descended
from strangers. In a completely different context, the new African
(Public Worlds Ser. No. 1, 6th prtg. 2003) for a powerful definition of globalisation as the
increased mobility of goods, people, and ideas; for him, ideas are at least as important as
the other two in this triplet.
52. See Li, supra note 2, at 164, 170.
53. Richard Ban6gas, C6te d'Ivoire: les jeunes o se lvent en hommes n Anticolonialisme
et ultranationalisme chez les Jeunes Patriotes d'Abidjan 11-12 (Centre d'Etudes et de
Recherches Internationales, Les 9tudes du CERI Paper No. 137, 2007.
54. Ruth Marshall-Fratani, The War of "Who Is Who" Autochthony, Nationalism, and
Citizenship in the Ivorian Crisis, 49 AFR. STUD. REV. 9, 27 (2006).
55. See id. See also Richard Ban~gas & Ruth Marshall-Fratani, C6te d'Ivoire, un conflit
rigional?, POLITIQUE AFRICAINE, Mar. 2003, at 5, 6; Ban6gas, supra note 53, at 32; H.M.
Yere, < La C6te d'Ivoire, c'est la C6te d'Ivoire! >: A Reflection on the Idea of the Nation in
C6te d'Ivoire (2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Until now, this idea
has only been applied in mitigated forms but it is still around in government circles.
56. See Stephen Jackson, Sons of Which Soil? The Language and Politics of
Autochthony in Eastern D.R. Congo, 49 AFR. STUD. REV. 95, 104-06 (2006).
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National Congressional democracy in South Africa became marked by
furious popular reactions for excluding all Makwere-kwere---"these"
Africans from across the Limpopo.
As important as democratization was, the drastic shift in the
policies of global development agencies, like the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund, and other major donors, was equally as
important. These policies shifted from an explicitly statist view to an
equally blunt distrust of the state.57 Up to the early 1980s, it seemed
self-evident that development had to be realized through the state and
that the first priority was strengthening the state and encouraging
nation-building by the new state elites. The state was subsequently no
longer seen as a pillar, but rather as a major barrier to development in
the World Bank's official view.58 The Bank's 1989 report on Africa, not
coincidentally coinciding with the very moment the Cold War was
clearly over, made "bypassing the state," strengthening "civil society"
and NGOs, and, notably, "decentralization" the buzz words.59 But just
as democratization created an unexpected scope for autochthony
movements, the new decentralization policy and the support of NGOs,
often quite local in character, similarly turned issues of belonging and
exclusion into burning questions. In Cameroon, for instance, a new
forest law, heavily supported by the World Bank and World Wildlife
Fund, helped to make autochthony-that is, the question as to who
could be excluded from the development projects new style by "not
really" belonging-a hot item, even in areas that are so thinly populated
that there seem to be no demographic pressure on the soil or other
resources.
Important in all of this is that such developments cannot be
dismissed as merely political games (maneuvers imposed from above by
shrewd politicians or well-meaning "developers"). Political
manipulations and external interventions by development agencies
certainly play a role in all of the examples quoted above, but they can
only work because the very idea of local belonging strikes such a deep
emotional chord with the population in general. Indeed, the force of the
emotions unleashed by a political appeal to autochthony is often so
strong that it threatens to sweep the very politicians who launched it
right from their feet. This is, for instance, vividly illustrated by the
increasing importance throughout the African continent of the funeral
57. See, e.g., The World Bank, The World Bank's Changing Discourse on Development,
in READINGS IN MODERNITY IN AFRICA 27 (Peter Geschiere et al. eds., 2008) (containing an
overview of speeches by World Bank directors and other representatives from 1972 to
1989 that shows how deep a shift took place in the 1980s).
58. See id.
59. Id. at 30.
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"at home" (that is, in the village of origin). The funeral turns into a true
festival of belonging, often to the clear discomfort of urban elites who
dread such occasions when the villagers can get even with "their
brothers" in the cities. Marked by a proliferation of all sorts of "neo-
traditional" rites that often involve great expenditure, these occasions
show how deeply this obsession with belonging is rooted in society. It
also shows the complex balancing that exists between returning and
maintaining the distance required from urban elites.
Indeed, for many regions, there is a direct link between
democratization and the increasing exuberance of the funeral "at home,"
a clear sign of how important local belonging has become. All of this is
not in spite of liberalization, but rather because of liberalization.
Therefore, a major challenge in studying autochthony and the politics of
belonging is identifying the relationship between shrewd political
manipulation, on the one hand, and deep emotional involvement, on the
other, since the combination of both seems to be at the heart of the
conundrum of belonging and exclusion that is becoming so central in our
supposedly globalizing world.
One of the interesting aspects of the term autochthony is that it
easily bridges the gap between the global South and North.60
Apparently, its language works as well in Flanders or Holland as it does
in Cameroon or the Ivory Coast, but the background here is rather the
increasing fear of transnational immigrants-"guest laborers"-who are
not planning to go back home again.
In the late 1980s, I became familiar with the Dutch version of the
term autochthony, mainly from the Netherlands' southern neighbors in
Flanders. But in subsequent years, the term also conquered the
Netherlands with surprising speed. In 2002, the shocking murder of
Pim Fortuyn, Holland's most successful populist politician made his
heritage all the more powerful.61 Since Fortuyn's meteoric career, Dutch
politicians have realized that electoral success depends on taking
autochthony seriously. Since the murder, the defense of the
"autochthonous cultural heritage"-which for the Dutch, always proud
of not being overly nationalistic, proved to be quite hard to define-has
become a dominant theme, together with the idea that more pressure is
needed to make immigrants "integrate" into this elusive culture.62
60. In this respect, there is again an interesting difference with the related notion of
"indigenous." The latter seems to retain its exoticizing tenor (it mostly refers to "others"-i.e.
people with a non-Western background). Autochthons are not necessarily the "others."
Indeed, the term can be adopted by majority populations also in the West. See supra Part I.
61. See GESCHIERE, supra note 1, at 134-36.
62. See id. at 135-37.
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The term autochthony is now less current in France and is almost
absent in Germany and the United Kingdom, even though similar
concerns about belonging are high on the political agenda there as well.
However, the term crops up in unexpected places. In Italy, Umberto
Bosi has recently adopted it for his Lega Norte; it has also emerged
strongly in the Pacific and in Quebec, although in a different sense.
An illustration can show how great the confusion can become when
autochthony, with its different meanings, crosses the lines between
continents. In 2006, I attended, together with several Africanists, a
conference focusing on the theme of autochthony at the Ecole des
Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris' leading institute for social
sciences. The conference was organized in close collaboration by
colleagues from Quebec and France. For the Qu6b6cois and their French
counterparts, the meaning of autochthony was clear. In the 1980s, they
had decided that it was the translation of the budding Anglophone
notion of "indigenous," clearly because since the colonial period, the
more direct French translation indig~ne had such a pejorative charge
that it had to be avoided at all costs.68 The Quebec version of the term,
les autochtones means "indigenous people"-that is, people in a
minority position who are threatened in their way of life by dominant
groups. In this view, Quebec's Native Americans are the prototype of
peuples autochtones.
At the conference, however, the Quebec colleagues discovered, to
their dismay, that in other continents, the term had acquired quite
different meanings. It was difficult for them to accept that, for instance,
in Cameroon and elsewhere in Africa, the term "autochthonous" did not
primarily refer to groups like the "Pygmies" or endangered pastoralists.
Rather, the term was commonly claimed by well-established groups who
were in control of the state and who tried to use this against immigrants
who were still seen as foreigners. Even more surprising seemed to be
the fact that, for instance, in Flanders and the Netherlands, the
majority of the population was happy to be labeled "autochthons." As
one participant from Quebec put it most eloquently, "If the Dutch are so
foolish as to label themselves 'autochthons,' it is their affair. But the
United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations has already
63. Particularly galling is the memory of the French institution of the Indig6nat - the
lower juridical status of the indigines (in sharp contrast to the citoyens), which until 1944,
gave the harsher forms of French colonial rule (including policies of coercive labor and
corporal punishment) a formal basis. Compare the challenge implied by the quite brutal
name-at least in French-of a recent film, INDIGNES (Tessalit Productions 2006), on the
generally neglected role of African soldiers in the French army in the Second World War.
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decided that autochtone is the French translation of 'indigenous.' And I
think we should stick to this."64
It was of little use to question the United Nations' mandate
regarding a term that clearly had very different histories in different
parts of the globe. In addition, the suggestion that the Qu6bcois might
be tempted to use the term for themselves in their relation to
Anglophone "latecomers" seemed to be even more hilarious to a large
part of the audience. Apparently in Canada, the autochthone has to be
the "Other," with his own, endangered culture.
III. A NEO-LIBERAL MOMENT? BETTING ON THE MARKET AND
'TRADITIONAL" FORMS OF BELONGING
It is tempting to see the recent upsurge of autochthony in different
places of the globe as an unexpected outcome of the neoliberal tide that
forcefully swept our globalizing world at the end of the Cold War.
Indeed, democratization and decentralization, the dominant trends in
the African continent since 1990, fit very well with the so-called
"Washington Consensus," tersely summarized by Jim Ferguson as a
society that believes in "less state interference and inefficiency" and, one
could add, more leeway for the market. 65 Yet, the explanatory value of
invoking neoliberalism as a final cause may be overstretched.66 In
recent seminars and conferences, many colleagues have warned that
this notion, just like globalization, is rapidly becoming a panacea that
seems to apply to a discouragingly wide range of phenomena. Therefore,
it is necessary to be more specific.
A leitmotiv in the examples above is the surprising penchant of
many advocates of neoliberal reform for "tradition" and belonging. There
is of course an interesting paradox presented here: how can one combine
a fixed belief in the market as the solution to all problems with far-
reaching trust in the community or customary chiefs as stable
64. See the French title of the United Nation's Working Group on Indigenous
Populations, Groupe de travail sur les populations autochtones, OFF. U.N. HIGH
COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS., http://www2.ohchr.org/frenchlissues/indigenous/groups/groups-
01.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
65. JAMES FERGUSEN, GLOBAL SHADOwS: AFRICA IN THE NEOLIBERAL WORLD ORDER 39
(2006). The term "Washington Consensus" was coined by economist John Williamson in
1989, in order to summarize basic-and supposedly novel-principles behind IMF and
World Bank policies at the time. Apparently he bitterly deplored having launched this
term subsequently. John Williamson, A Short History of the Washington Consensus, in
THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED 14 (2008).
66. I thank Daniel J. Smith for his critical comments on this point.
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footholds?67 For Africa, this focus on community, tradition, and
chieftaincy seems to be a logical consequence of the belief in
decentralization as a panacea. If one wants to bypass the state and
reach out to civil society, then local forms of organization and
traditional authorities seem to be obvious points of orientation.
Unfortunately, this new approach to development tends to ignore that
most traditional communities are the product of incisive colonial and
post-colonial interventions. Even more serious is the extreme
indifference to the fact that focusing on such local partners inevitably
raises ardent issues of belonging; that is, chiefs relate only to their own
subjects and tend to discriminate against immigrants, who were in fact
often previously encouraged to migrate by colonial development
projects. Local communities now have a tendency to close themselves off
and apply severe exclusion policies to people who were once considered
fellows.
For different reasons, the same paradox emerges with the
protagonists of the New Right in Europe (and elsewhere). For instance,
it is striking that, while liberalism on this continent used to be equated
with various forms of anticlericalism (or an insistence on a strict
separation of religion and state), neoliberal spokesmen now often plea
for a resurrection of "Judeo-Christian values" as an anchor for society.
More importantly, they manage to combine the liberal principle of
reducing interference of the state with a vocal appeal to the same state
to exercise almost total control over society (mostly against suspect
immigrants),68 thus strengthening the presence of the state in everyday
life instead of promoting a withdrawal. Neoliberalism may be a fuzzy
phenomenon, but this surprising combination of market and tradition
has concrete effects.
The above may help to relativize the apparent naturalness of
autochthony. In the different contexts discussed above-in classical
67. Striking illustrations of this penchant are described in the recent thesis by Juan
Obarrio, The Spirit of the Law in Mozambique (2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Columbia University), on Mozambique which in many respects offers a fascinating view of
what the author terms the "Structural Adjustment State." Obarrio describes, for instance,
that a senior American UNDP official assured him that "communities know how they are
and know also their boundaries perfectly well"-this, in order to counter warnings by some
observers that "the" community on which his organization wants to base its new projects
might in practice be highly elusive and volatile. Similarly a British USAID consultant
insisted that "communities 'will be like corporations, unified single legal subjects under
the new land law."' Id. See generally Helene Maria Kyed & Lars Burr, Introduction:
Traditional Authority and Democratization in Africa, in STATE RECOGNITION AND
DEMOCRATIZATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 1, 16 (Lars Burr & Helene Maria Kyed eds.,
2007) (noting the unexpected comeback of traditional chiefs in a neo-liberal context).
68. See, e.g., GESCHIERE, supra note 1, at 144-45.
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Athens, as much as in the different manifestations of the neoliberal
moment of our days-autochthony may present itself as self-evident,
but in practice, it turns out to be always contested and full of
uncertainty. One sad example from a recent article on the Ivory Coast
illustrates the dangerous ambiguities hidden in this now so current
notion.6 9 The article is based on courageous fieldwork on a violent topic:
the roadblocks that were erected in the southern Ivory Coast
countryside by Gbagbo's Jeunes Patriotes after 2000.70 Soon these
barrages and their revenues-mostly "fines" extorted by violent threats
from "strangers"-became a way of life for these youngsters, mostly
rurbains (disappointed urbanites, forced by the ongoing crisis to return
to "their" village). Quite surprisingly, these Jeunes Patriotes tended to
posit themselves as the guardians of autochthony and tradition, often in
direct confrontation with their elders, whom they reproached to have
squandered their ancestral lands to strangers, leaving nothing for
them.7 1 Some elders still preferred to lease the land to strangers who at
least paid some rent. Yet, while many youngsters succeeded in
reclaiming "their" lands, often through violent means, they quickly
became disappointed with the rural way of life. A number of them have
already tried to sell their new farms in order to get money for a ticket to
Europe or beyond. 72
In this one example, all the tragic contradictions of the notion of
autochthony seem to be condensed-most importantly, its basic
insecurity, hidden under an appearance of self-evidence, which can so
easily lead to violence. More generally, autochthony's volatile relation to
citizenship shows that appeals to history and culture, central in such
claims to belonging, offer quite slippery footholds for defining who can
qualify as a full citizen and who can be excluded as a "stranger." The
culturalization of citizenship, which seems to be a recurrent aspect of
the "global conjuncture of belonging," has great emotional appeal in
many settings. Juridical or economic aspects are thus relegated to the
background. Yet, precisely because such cultural and historical claims
to belonging are, despite apparent self-evidence, beset by deep
uncertainties, they confound issues of citizenship rather than clarify
them.
69. Jean-Pierre Chauveau & Koffi Samuel Bobo, La situation de guerre dans l'arine
villageoise. Un exemple dans le Centre-Ouest ivoirien, POLITIQUE AFRICAINE, Mar. 2003, at 12.
70. Id. at 20.
71. Id. at 27-28. See also Cyprian Fisiy, Discourses of Autochthony: Regimes of
Citizenship and the Control of Assets in Cdte d'Ivoire (Nov. 1999) (paper presented at the
African Studies Association Annual Meeting, in Phila.) (unpublished manuscript), for an
early analysis of the tensions over land in Ivory Coast between elders and youngsters.
72. Id. at 29.
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